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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by §78-2-2(3)(j),
U.C.A. This appeal is from an order of the District Court of
the Third Judicial District of Summit County, State of Utah
denying a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint. This court
ordered that an interlocutory appeal be granted on March 7,
1990, pursuant to a Petition for Permission to Appeal pursuant
to Rule 5, Rules of Appellate Procedure. The order to be
reviewed is the Order dated December 28, 1989 and entered
January 3, 1990. The Petition for Permission to Appeal was
filed January 12, 1990.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I
STANDARD'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT FILED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE
TRUSTEE'S SALE AS REQUIRED BY §57-1-32, U.C.A.
THIS TIME
RESTRICTION IS A JURISDICTIONAL CONDITION ON THE RIGHT TO A
DEFICIENCY THAT IS NOT EXTENDED BY THE RENEWAL STATUTE OF §7812-40, U.C.A., WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO GENERAL STATUTES OF
LIMITATION.
POINT I.A
THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT IS TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND THE
RENEWAL STATUTE WAS NOT INTENDED TO ALTER THOSE STRICT
REQUIREMENTS.
POINT Z.B
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
WOULD NOT APPLY THE RENEWAL STATUTE TO THE UTAH TRUST DEED
ACT.
POINT I.C
CAUSES OF ACTION CREATED BY STATUTE AND WHICH CONTAIN THEIR
OWN TIME LIMITATIONS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY RENEWAL STATUTES.
POINT I.D
OF ALL THE UTAH CASES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED THE APPLICATION
OF THE RENEWAL STATUTE, NONE HAS APPLIED IT TO EXTEND THE
TIME FOR FILING A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION CONTAINING ITS
OWN INTERNAL TIME LIMITATION.
POINT II
STANDARD'S CLAIM AGAINST KIRKBRIDE AND SOULE IS BARRED FOR
FAILURE TO ALLOW THREE MONTHS FOR REINSTATEMENT UNDER §57-124, U.C.A. OF THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT.

vi-

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The facts in this case are not in dispute.
The issues
involved present only questions of statutory interpretation
which are questions of law. This Court is to review the lower
court's decision only for correctness, without according any
deference thereto.
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah
1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); Asav v.
Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
§7-15-1

Civil liability of issuer—Notice.

(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues any check,
draft, order, or other instrument upon any depository
institution, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation any money, merchandise, property, or other thing
of value or paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent,
shall be liable to the holder of the check, draft, order, or
other instrument if the check, draft, order, or other
instrument is not honored upon presentment and is marked
"refer to maker" or the account with the depository upon which
the check, draft, order, or other instrument has been made or
drawn does not exist, has been closed, or does not have
sufficient funds or sufficient credit with the depository for
payment of the check, draft, or other instrument in full.
§57-1-24

Sale of
default.

trust

property

by

trustee—Notice

of

The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be
exercised until:
(1) The trustee first files for record, in the office of the
recorder of each county where the trust property or some part
or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default,
identifying the trust deed by stating the name of the trustor
named therein and giving the book and page where the trust
deed is recorded and a legal description of the trust
property, and containing a statement that a breach of an
obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as
security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of that
breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold the
property to satisfy the obligation;
(2) Not less than three months has thereafter elapsed; and
(3) After the lapse of at least three months the trustee
shall give notice of sale as provided in this act.
•vii-

§57-1-32

Sale of trust property by trustee—Action to
recover balance due upon obligation for which trust
deed was given as security.

At any time within three months after any sale of property
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action
the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount
for which such property was sold, and the fair market value
thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of
the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property
as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under this
section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an
action under this section.
§63-30-13 Claim
against
political
subdivision
employee—Time for filing notice•

or

its

A claim against a political subdivision, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
within one year after the claim arises, or before the
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 6330-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental.
§63-30-15 Denial of claim for injury—Authority and time for
filing action against governmental entity.
(BEFORE AMENDMENT)

If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action
in the district court against the governmental entity in those
circumstances where immunity from suit has been waived as in
this act provided. Said action must be commenced within one
year after denial or the denial period as specified herein.

-vni-

§63-30-15 Denial of claim for injury—Authority and time for
filing action against governmental entity.
(AFTER AMENDMENT)

(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an
action in the district court against the governmental entity
or an employee of the entity.
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
§78-12-1

Time for commencement of actions generally.

Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation
is prescribed by statute.
§78-12-26 Within three years.
Within three years:
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real
property; except that when waste or trespass is
committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim,
the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or
trespass.
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal
property, including actions for specific recovery thereof;
except that in all cases where the subject of the action is a
domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock",
which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without
the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner
has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable
man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the
defendant.
(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake;
except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of
this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the
laws of this state, except where in special cases a different
limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state.
-ix-

(5) an action to enforce liability imposed by §78-17-3,
except that the cause of action does not accrue until the
aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm
suffered.
§78-12-28 Within two years.
Within two years, an action:
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or other officer
upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his
official capacity, and in virtue of his office, or by the
omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of
money collected upon an execution; but this section does not
apply to an action for an escape;
(2) for recovery damages for the death of one caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another; or
(3) for injury to the personal rights of another as a civil
rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
§78-12-29 Within one year.
Within one year:
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a
foreign state.
(2) an action upon a statute or a penalty or forfeiture
where the action is given to an individual, or to an
individual and the state, except when the statute imposing it
prescribes a different limitation.
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a
criminal action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state.
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false
imprisonment or seduction.
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the
escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil
or criminal process.
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages
or injuries to property caused by a mob or riot.
§78-12-40 Effect of failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff
fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than
upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure.

-x-

§78-14-2

Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of
act.

The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits
and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in
recent years.
Because of these increases the insurance
industry has substantially increased the cost of medical
malpractice insurance.
The effect of increased insurance
premiums and increased claims is increased care cost, both
through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums
to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive
medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary
in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are
discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the
high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice
insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of
alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are
producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary
to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed
to encourage private insurance companies to continue to
provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the same
time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from
private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature
to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers while limiting that time to a
specific period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation
and settlement of claims.

-XI-

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OP THE
STATE OP UTAH

STANDARD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND '
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a federally
chartered savings and loan,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No, 90-0017

vs.
THOMAS K. KIRKBRIDE and
RUFE SOULE, both individuals,
Defendants-Appellants,

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The plaintif f-appellee, Standard Federal Savings and Loan
Association (hereinafter referred to as "Standard"), filed a
prior

action

Kirkbride

and

against
Rufe

defendants-appellants,

Soule

(hereinafter

Thomas

referred

to

K.
as

"Kirkbride and Soule"), to recover a deficiency asserted to be
due after a trustee's sale under a trust deed against real
property in Park City, Utah.
without prejudice.

That action was dismissed

This action was then filed by Standard

against Kirkbride and Soule more than two years after the
trustee's sale. Kirkbride and Soule filed a motion to dismiss
1

on the grounds that the complaint was not filed within three
months of the trustee's sale as required by §57-1-32, Utah
Code Annotated.

Disposition in the Lower Court
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss in reliance
on §78-12-40, U.C.A., which allows certain actions to be
refiled within a year after they have been dismissed without
prejudice.

However,

since this was

a matter

of

first

impression in the State of Utah and could be conclusive of all
issues in this case, the lower court certified its decision
for appeal.

Although that certification was not binding on

this Court, the petition of Kirkbride and Soule for permission
to appeal was granted.

Statement of Facts
On November 27, 1984, Kirkbride and Soule signed and
delivered to Standard a promissory note for $244,000.00 (R.8)
and secured that note with a deed of trust covering real
property in Park City, Utah (R.ll).

Because of a delinquency

in payments due under the note, a Notice of Default was
recorded November 5, 1986 (R.17) and, thereafter, on February
2,

1987, before

three months had

expired,

a Notice of

Trustee's Sale was issued setting a trustee's sale for March
11, 1987 (R.19).

On March 11, 1987 the trustee sold the

2

property to Standard for $150,000.00 and a trustee's deed was
issued and recorded that same day (R.20).
Although the date of filing is not alleged in Standard's
complaint, a prior complaint was filed by Standard on June 8,
1987

seeking

a

deficiency

judgment

in

the

$116,400.00 against Kirkbride and Soule (R.44).

amount

of

The summons

in that action was not issued until February 8, 1988.

That

complaint did not contain any allegation as to the fair market
value of the property. (R.44)

Kirkbride and Soule filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint on that ground and on the
additional ground that no summons had been issued within three
months from the date of filing of the complaint as required by
Rule 4(b), U.R.C.P.

That motion to dismiss was granted by

the court on the latter ground and the case was dismissed
without prejudice on May 2, 1988 (R.7).
Thereafter, on March 13, 1989, more than two years after
the trustee's sale, Standard filed a second complaint seeking
a deficiency judgment against Kirkbride and Soule based on the
trustee's sale of March 11, 1987 (R.l).

Kirkbride and Soule

filed a motion to dismiss this complaint on the ground that it
was not filed within the three-month time requirement of §571-32, U.C.A. and failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted (R.27). The lower court denied the motion to
dismiss in its ruling

from the bench but certified

its

These facts do not appear in the record in this case but appear in
the file in the prior action and are not in dispute.
3

decision for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P.
(R.72) and signed the Certification for Appeal and the Order
denying the motion to dismiss on December

19 , 1989 and

December 28, 1989, respectively (R.73 and 76). A Petition for
Permission to Appeal was filed January 12, 1990 (R.80) and
granted March 7, 1990 (R.79).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

SECTION 57-1-32 IS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR A DEFICIENCY
AFTER A TRUSTEE'S SALE.
The Utah Trust Deed Act requires a suit for a deficiency

judgment to be filed within three months of the trustee's
sale.

This is the exclusive remedy for a deficiency after a

trustee's sale and the failure of Standard to file this suit
within that time period is a forfeiture of that right. While
a prior action was filed within the three-month period and was
dismissed without prejudice, the right to a deficiency was not
saved by the renewal statute of §78-12-40, which allows some
actions dismissed other than on the merits to be refiled
within a year of the dismissal. There are several reasons why
the renewal statute does not apply:
A.

THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS OF THE TRUST DEED ACT
CANNOT BE NULLIFIED BY THE RENEWAL STATUTE.
Because the Utah Trust Deed Act eliminates the

judicial protections and the redemption period available to a
debtor in order to allow a creditor to foreclose more quickly
4

in an ex parte, non-judicial proceeding, that act has been and
should be strictly construed.

Each of its requirements is

intended to protect the debtor and preserve his property and
is a condition on the creditor's right to a deficiency. Those
strict substantive requirements cannot be overridden by the
procedural extension provisions of the renewal statute. It is
inconceivable that a three-month substantive right would be
extended, after its expiration, especially for an additional
year because of the plaintiff's own procedural failures.
B,

THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTES AND A REASONABLE
CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID CONFLICT MAKES THE RENEWAL
STATUTE INAPPLICABLE TO THE TRUST DEED ACT.
Neither the intent nor the words used by the 1872

legislature

should

abrogate

the

intent

of

the

1961

legislature. The letter of a statute should not prevail over
its purpose.

The words of the renewal statute have not been

applied literally in the past and they should not be so
applied here when such application would result in unintended
consequences. The trust deed act and the renewal statute can
be reasonably construed to avoid conflict and to give full
effect to both. Furthermore, §78-12-1, U.C.A., clearly makes
the renewal statute inapplicable to statutory causes of action
which contain their own internal time limitations.
C.

THE THREE-MONTH RIGHT TO A DEFICIENCY IS A
JURISDICTIONAL RESTRICTION ON THE EXERCISE OF THAT
RIGHT,
The majority of courts throughout the country hold

that statutes which create rights with self-contained time

limitations are not affected by renewal statutes.

This is

consistent with the Utah cases which hold these internal time
limitations to be conditions of the liability itself and not
just limitations on the remedy.

The three-month limit on a

deficiency action is not a statute of limitation and is not
governed by any of the provisions in the codified statutes of
limitation, including the renewal statute.
D.

ALL UTAH CASES ARE CONSISTENT IN NOT APPLYING THE
RENEWAL STATUTE TO STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION WITH
INTERNAL LIMITATIONS.
While no Utah cases have been found which rule on

the application of the renewal statute to the trust deed act,
all of the Utah cases which consider the application of the
renewal statute to other causes of action are consistent with
and support the view that the right to file a deficiency is
not extended by the renewal statute.

Any application of the

renewal statute has been either to a non-statutory cause of
action, to a statutory cause of action without its own time
limitation, or to a statute with its own time limitation but
which does not create the cause of action.

In the latter

case, the statute was within Chapter 12 of Title 78 and was,
therefore, appropriately governed by the renewal statute in
Chapter 12 of Title 78.

No case has applied the renewal

statute to a statutory cause of action with its own time
limitation.

6

II•

STANDARD AND THE TRUSTEE HAD NO RIGHT TO PROCEED WITH A
SALE AND A DEFICIENCY ACTION BECAUSE THE REINSTATEMENT
PERIOD HAD NOT EXPIRED.
The

trustee's

failure

to

allow

a

three-month

reinstatement period before proceeding with the trustee's sale
was an additional violation of the strict requirements of the
trust deed act.

He had no authority to sell the property or

give notice of the sale until that reinstatement period
expired and that failure was another precondition to the right
to sue for a deficiency.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
STANDARD'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT PILED WITHIN THREE
MONTHS OP THE TRUSTEED SALE AS REQUIRED BY §57-132,
U.C.A.
THIS
TIME
RESTRICTION
IS A
JURISDICTIONAL CONDITION ON THE RIGHT TO A
DEFICIENCY THAT IS NOT EXTENDED BY THE RENEWAL
STATUTE OP §78-12-40, U.C.A., WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO
GENERAL STATUTES OP LIMITATION.
Standard foreclosed its trust deed against Kirkbride and
Soule in a private trustee's sale pursuant to the Utah Trust
Deed Act (§57-1-19 through 36, U.C^A.) and is now seeking to
recover a deficiency against Kirkbride and Soule pursuant to
§57-1-32 of that Act, which provides as follows:
"At any time within three months after any sale of
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove
provided, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust
deed was given as security, . . . ."
This section "provides the exclusive procedure for securing a
deficiency judgment following a trustee's sale of the real
7

property under a trust deed."

Cox v. Green. 696 P. 2d 1207

(Utah 1985) , at 1208. In that case the court held that "since
plaintiffs' action was not filed within three months of the
date of the trustee's sale of the real property,
plaintiffs are not entitled to a deficiency judgment."

This

position was upheld even with respect to the holder of a note
secured by a second trust deed after a trustee's sale by the
holder of the first trust deed in City Consumer Services, Inc.
v. Peters. Case No. 880153, filed May 3, 1990 (Utah Sup. Ct.).
The remedy

of

§57-1-32, U.C.A.,

is exclusive

after any

trustee's sale of the security.
In this matter, Standard held its trustee's sale on March
11, 1987 and filed an action under §57-1-32 to recover a
deficiency against Kirkbride and Soule but that action was
dismissed on May 2, 1988. Standard then filed a new action on
March 13, 1989, ten months after the dismissal of the prior
action and two years after the trustee's sale.

Standard

recognizes that its action is too late under §57-1-32, which
requires such actions to be filed within three months after
the trustee's sale, but it claims the right to file this new
action under §78-12-40, U.C.A., which provides as follows:
"If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or
if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a
cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and
the time limited either by law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new
action within one year after the reversal or
failure."
8

While, on the surface, this renewal or savings statute,
as such statutes are called, appears to allow this action to
be refiled, neither the law nor common sense supports that
position.

There are several reasons why the renewal statute

does not apply to the Utah Trust Deed Act.
A. THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT IS TO BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AND THE RENEWAL STATUTE WAS NOT
INTENDED TO ALTER THOSE STRICT REQUIREMENTS,
The Utah Trust Deed Act, like those in effect in other
states, was enacted, in part, to provide a more speedy and
efficient foreclosure remedy. However, since that remedy has
eliminated the traditional protections available to a debtor,
such as judicial notice and hearing, judicial supervision,
sale by a public officer, and a redemption period, such
statutes are to be strictly construed.

59 C.J.S., Mortgages,

§557, which provides:
"A power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of
trust must be strictly pursued, and, in order to
render the sale valid, there must be a full
compliance with all its terms and conditions which
have not been waived.
There must also be a
compliance with all legal requirements for a valid
sale, and a misstep or defect in matter of
substance cannot be cured by showing that it was
accidental or caused by mistake and was not the
result of fraud or bad faith."
And, then at page 920:
"Where statutes regulate the exercise of powers of
sale in mortgages and trust deeds, full compliance
with such provisions is essential to the validity
of the sale. The statute in such cases supersedes
the grant of power in the mortgage and is read into
it as though set out therein."
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Concepts. Inc. v. First
Security Realty Services. Inc., 743 P. 2d 1158 (Utah 1987), by
citation to other cases, has stated, at pp. 1160-61:
"The reason for strict compliance with the statute
*is to protect the property of the debtor1 . . . .
*The grantor of the power is entitled to have his
directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of
sale given; to have it take place at the time and
place, and by the person appointed by him1. . .
.xThe right of a grantor of a deed of trust to have
its provision strictly complied with to effect a
valid foreclosure sale is absolute.1"
The court then held the defendant's attempt to extend the time
for

filing

a

deficiency

action

by

scheduling

a

second

trustee's sale invalid, in these words:
" . . . Defendant thereafter [after the trustee's
sale] had three months to institute action to
recover any balance due on the obligation for which
the trust deeds were given as security. Utah Code
Ann. §57-1-32. Once a trust deed sale has been
made, that remedy is the exclusive remedy under
statute . . . .
" . . . Defendant's failure to bring a deficiency
action within three months after the sale of the
property terminated all of plaintiffs' remaining
obligations,
and
defendant's
attempt
at
rescheduling the same property for a second sale
was improper as a matter of law."
The Utah Supreme Court has also held, in Blodaett v. Martsch,
590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978), that the trustee under a deed of
trust has a fiduciary relationship with the trustor which
imposes on the trustee "a duty to treat the trustor fairly and
in accordance with a high punctilio of honor" (p. 302) and to
comply with the "clear statutory duties" (p. 303).
This view of the strictness with which the statutory
requirements must be followed applies equally to that portion
10

of the statute which limits the right to sue for a deficiency
to three months.

This is clear from Cox v. Green and City

Consumer Services. Inc. v. Peters, supra, which held the
three-month period for a deficiency action to be the exclusive
remedy after any trustee's sale of the property, but is
especially obvious from Concepts, Inc. v. First Security
Realty Services, Inc., supra. where an attempt to extend the
time for filing a deficiency action was invalidated.

If the

strict requirements of the Utah Trust Deed Act are not
followed, the beneficiary has the benefit of the trust deed
procedure without paying the price for those benefits.
expressed

by the

Court of Appeals

in G. Adams

As

Limited

Partnership v. Durbana, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah App. 1989), at 964:
"Nonjudicial foreclosure of a trust deed spares the
beneficiary the cost of a lawsuit and the delay and
uncertainty of a six-month redemption period. It
is appropriate however, to impose a price on these
benefits.
The price is chiefly in the form of
restrictions on the availability of a deficiency
judgment.
The action must be brought almost
immediately and the deficiency amount will be
calculated with reference to the fair market value
of the property rather than the amount bid. See
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1986).
It is fair to
extract this price from the beneficiary who made
the decision to take the nonjudicial shortcut."
And, of course, a failure to follow the strict requirements of
the Trust Deed Act causes the debtor to lose both the benefits
of

a

judicial

foreclosure

(notice,

hearing,

judicial

supervision, sale by a public officer, redemption period,

See also Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah App. 1988) at 41, ftn. 2.

etc.) and the benefits of the trust deed procedure (limited
time for deficiency action, deficiency amount limited by fair
market value of property, etc.)^

Therefore, the strict

construction of the Trust Deed Act must be maintained to
preserve its own purpose and justification.
In view of the strictness with which the Utah Trust Deed
Act is to be interpreted and the exclusive three-month remedy
provided therein for a deficiency, it is not conceivable that
the renewal statute should apply to destroy that strictness
and exclusivity by extending a three-month right for an
additional year after the expiration of the three months. It
does not make sense to extend the length of a time-limited
right beyond what it was originally.

The narrow and exact

nature of the provisions of the Trust Deed Act would be
nullified.
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE RULES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION WOULD NOT APPLY THE RENEWAL
STATUTE TO THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT.
Beyond the common sense normally applied in statutory
interpretation that would not extend for one whole year the
right to file an action which must be brought within three
months in the first place, there are well-recognized rules of
statutory construction and of implied legislative intent that
support the position that the right to a deficiency after a
trustee's sale is not renewed by §78-12-40, U.C.A.

Utah's

first renewal statute was adopted in 1872 • See Laws 1872, Ch.
IV, §27, p.24. The Utah Trust Deed Act was not adopted until
12

1961.

See §57-1-19, U.C.A., 1953 (Supp. 1961).

Obviously,

the 1961 legislature did not intend that the 1872 legislature
override the clear limitations

of

§57-1-32, U.C.A.

anything, the reverse would have been intended.

If

For example,

if the renewal statute were allowed to override the exclusive
remedy of the trust deed act, it would be possible for a party
to file an action for a deficiency, dismiss it voluntarily, as
was allowed in Luke v. Bennion, 36 Utah 61, 106 Pac. 712
(1909) , and obtain an extra year to file the action under the
renewal statute. That result could not have been intended by
the legislature.
To suggest that the 1872 legislature intended the words
"any action" to apply to all causes of action created, and to
all circumstances which may exist, in the future, about which
it had no knowledge, is to impute to it a prescience which it
would not have claimed for itself.

Courts are frequently

called upon to rule upon the application of statutes to
situations not contemplated by the legislators who adopted the
statutes. The applicable rule was stated by the United States
Supreme Court in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 14 3
U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892) as follows:
"It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within
the letter of the statute and yet not within the
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within
the intention of its makers. This has been often
asserted, and the reports are full of cases
illustrating its application.
This is not the
substitution of the will of the judge for that of
the legislator, for frequently words of general
meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough
to include an act in question, and yet a
13

consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the
absurd results which follow from giving such broad
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to
believe that the legislator intended to include the
particular act."
The court then quoted from United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall.
482, 19 L.Ed. 278:
"All laws should receive a sensible construction.
General terms should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression
or an absurd consequence.
It will always,
therefore, be presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language which would
avoid results of this character. The reason of the
law in such cases should prevail over its letter."
This same principle has been followed in Utah, as stated
in Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U.2d 184, 341 P.2d
207, 209 (1959), a case which refused to include within the
mechanic's

lien

statute

the

expenses

of

transporting

a

drilling rig to a well site even though the words of the
statute appeared to include them:
"It is to be conceded that a cursory reading of
that language makes Stanton's position seem quite
plausible.
However, it requires but little
reflection to realize that if the statute were
given such a broad interpretation, the door would
be open to the inclusion of any service pertaining
to the planning, exploration, solicitation of
finances, advertising, or even such things as
office rentals or legal services, which may be
regarded as bearing upon the development of an oil
well. This would distort the statute beyond its
design and make it impractical in its operation.
"When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation
and application of a statute, it is appropriate to
look to its purpose in the light of its background
and history, and also to the effect it will have in
practical application."
And then at 210:
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"While it is true that our statutes are to be
liberally construed to give effect to their purpose
and to promote justice, it is equally true that
they should not be distorted beyond the intent of
the 1egis1ature."
That principle was again followed in Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co, v. Payne. 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), a case, like
the one now before the court, in which the word "any" on the
face of the statute, appeared to be all inclusive, but the
court held otherwise.

The statute involved was §7-15-1(1),

U.C.A., which provides:
"Any person who makes, draws, signs or issues any
check, draft, order or other instrument upon any
depository institution, whether as corporate agent
or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any
person, firm, partnership, or corporation any
money, merchandise, property or other thing of
value or paying for any service, wages, salary or
rent, shall be liable to the holder of the check,
draft, order, or other instrument if the check,
draft, order or other instrument is not honored
upon presentment . . . ." (emphasis added)
Relying on the principle set forth in Stanton Transportation
Co. , supra, the court in Mountain States Tel. & Tel, held, at
466-7:
"It seems unlikely to us that the legislature
intended the statute at issue in this case to
subject innocent employees who sign checks at the
direction of their employees to personal liability
. . . . we may construe section 7-15-1 to require
that the signator of a bad check personally receive
benefits, services, or money transfer, or in the
alternative, have actual knowledge that the check
is drawn on insufficient funds in order to be held
liable."
Likewise, the words "any action" in §78-12-40 should be
construed to exclude unintended results, especially as applied
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to acts of the legislature adopted nearly one hundred years
later.
That the words of §78-12-40 are not to be read literally
but rather have flexible meanings is the holding of Thomas v.
Heirs of Braffet. 6 U.2d 57, 305 Po2d 507, 510-11 (1956), in
which the word "plaintiff" was construed to include defendants
who had filed an answer in the prior action.

Obviously, the

words of §78-12-40 have been given flexible meanings to
prevent unreasonable results.
Interestingly, Mountain States Tel. & Tel., supra, had a
secondary basis for its decision which also applies here. The
court pointed out a conflict between the literal wording of
§7-15-1 and §70A-3-403(2) and concluded:
"Where possible, statutes should be construed to be
mutually consistent . . . . Therefore, if section
7-15-1 is read as imposing strict liability,
amended section 70A-3-403 would have to be read to
exclude checks from its operation, and the uniform
application and the liberal construction intended
for the Uniform Commercial Code would be defeated.
If, however, section 7-15-1 is interpreted as
merely providing an expedited remedy against a
party who is liable under section 70A-3-403, then
section 7-15-1 can reasonably be construed to avoid
impliedly repealing section 70A-3-403."
Similarly, the strict construction intended for the Utah Trust
Deed Act would be defeated if §78-12-40 is read literally and
standing alone.

Since the trust deed act was adopted later,

it makes more sense to conclude that it impliedly amended the

3

But see Cunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983), in which "plaintiff"
did not include a decedent's statutory heirs who had not been plaintiffs
in the first action.
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renewal statute rather than making the trust deed act subject
to the earlier renewal statute.

However, there is another

long-standing and prevailing rule of law which allows these
two statutes to be reasonably construed to avoid an implied
repeal or amendment of either one of them.

That rule is

discussed in Point I.e. below.
Standard has argued in the lower court that "if the
legislature had wanted the trust deed statute to be excepted
from the operation of the savings statute, it easily could
have done so." (R.39)

The response to this argument is that

the legislature did except the trust deed statute from the
operation of the savings statute by including therein its own
limitation period rather than to allow the general statute of
limitations to apply. The Supreme Court, in State v. Lavoto,
776 P.2d 912 (Utah 1989), held that a "statute of limitations
that is created in the same act which establishes a new or
revised definition of a crime is deemed applicable to those
crimes included in the same act unless the Legislature clearly
provides otherwise."

Therefore, the three-month limitation

applies to a deficiency action under the trust deed act unless
the legislature, in that act, clearly provided otherwise,
which it did not.

The legislature has, however, clearly

provided, in its codification of the general statutes of
limitations, that the general statutes of limitations do not
apply to "specific cases where a different limitation is
prescribed by statute." To display the complete picture drawn
17

by this codification, all of the sections making reference to
other statutes and the renewal statute are quoted, including
the introductory section:
"78-12-1.

Time
for
generally.

commencement

of

actions

Civil actions may be commenced only within the
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause
of action has accrued, except in specific cases
where a different limitation is prescribed by
statute.
78-12-26.
•

Within three years.

• • •

(4) an action for a liability created by the
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except
where in special cases a different limitation is
prescribed by the statutes of this state.
78-12-29.
•

Within one year.

• • •

(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or
forfeiture where the action is given to an
individual, or to an individual and the state,
except when the statute imposing it prescribes a
different limitation.
78-12-40.

Effect of
merits.

failure

of

action

not

on

If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or
if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a
cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and
the time limited either by law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired, the
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new
action within one year after the reversal or
failure." (emphasis added)
A careful reading of these sections clearly shows that
the legislature has provided that the "special cases" of
18

"different limitations . . . prescribed by" other statutes
shall be governed by those different limitations and not by
these general statutes of limitation.

In particular, "the

periods prescribed in this chapter," that is, Chapter 12 of
Title 78, which includes the one year extension of §78-12-40,
do not apply

to the

"specific

cases where

limitation is prescribed by statute,"
legislature

has

clearly

provided

a different

§78-12-1.
that

the

Thus, the
"different

limitation" prescribed in §57-1-32 is not governed by the
limitation periods of Chapter 12, Title 78 and is not extended
by the renewal statute of §78-12-40.
As between §57-1-32 and §78-12-40, the rule of statutory
construction which applies is the rule which would apply a
reasonable construction to uphold both provisions as written
without

conflict.

The

interpretation

which

avoids

any

conflict between the two statutes is the one which does not
apply the renewal statute to the trust deed statute.
between

§57-1-32

and

§78-12-1,

the

rule

of

As

statutory

construction which applies is commonly known as the plain
meaning rule.

Where a statute is clear upon its face and is

susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be
given to it.

Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421, 20

S.Ct. 155, 44- L.Ed. 219 (1899).

This rule is supported by

another rule of statutory construction, relied on in Grayson
Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989),
at 471-2:
19
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. . . separate parts of an act should not be
construed in isolation from the rest of the act • .
. and the terms of related code provisions should
be construed in a harmonious fashion . . . ."
Section 78-12-1 plainly excludes the application of Chapter 12
time periods, and extensions thereof, to other statutes which
contain their own time limitations.
C. CAUSES OP ACTION CREATED BY STATUTE AND WHICH
CONTAIN THEIR OWN TIME LIMITATIONS ARE NOT
AFFECTED BY RENEWAL STATUTES.
Furthermore, statutes, such as the Utah Trust Deed
Act, which create causes of action not recognized by the
common law and which contain their own time limitations are
not affected by renewal statutes.

Such self-contained time

requirements are not considered to be statutes of limitations
but rather conditions precedent to the bringing of the action
itself. This position is stated in 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation
of Actions, §309, as follows:
"§309. Application to statutory causes of action.
Generally speaking, statutes permitting a new
action to be brought after the expiration of the
period of limitations, upon the failure of a
previous action commenced within that period, have
been regarded as applying to actions founded upon
nonstatutory rights or upon rights formerly
existing independently of statute. Moreover, where
a statute creates a right of action which did not
exist at common law, and which does not obtain in
the absence of such statute, the limitation
prescribed therein, within which such action must
be commenced, is a condition imposed upon the
exercise of the right of action granted, and this
time is not extended by the pendency and dismissal
of a former action. This is because the time limit
described in such a statute is ordinarily regarded
as a limitation upon the right itself, so that when
the time expires, the right is extinguished except
as to actions then pending."
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Thus, renewal statutes have been held not applicable to
actions to contest an election governed by an internal 20-day
limitation, Casey v. Burdine, 214 Ark. 680, 217 S.W. 2d 613
(1949); to a summary proceeding to foreclose a lien on a
sawmill, Walker v. Burt, 57 Ga. 20 (1876); to a statutory
right of foreclosure on a materialmen's lien with an internal
limitation, Chamlee Lumber Co. v. Crichton, 136 Ga. 391, 71
S.E. 673 (1911); to a statutory action to revive a judgment
governed by an internal limitation, Berkley v. Tootle, 62 Kan.
701, 64 Pac. 620 (1901) ; to a statutory action contesting the
validity of a will governed by an internal limitation, Re
Estate of Speake, 743 P. 2d 648 (1987 Okla.); Peacock v.
Churchill, 38 111. App. 634, 120 ALR 381 (1890); to an action
for reinstatement of a police officer, King v. Butte, 71 Mont.
309, 230 Pac. 62 (1924); to the 90-day period for bringing an
action on a claim rejected by an administrator, Poole v.
Rutherford, 199 S.W. 2d 665 (1947 Tex. Civ. App.); to the 20day period allowed for contesting a workman's compensation
award (even though the renewal statute only allowed 60 days to
refile) , Leadon v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 253 S.W. 2d 903 (1952
Tex.

Civ.

App.);

and

even

to

wrongful

death

statutes

containing their own limitation periods, Rodman v. Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co. , 65 Kan. 645, 70 Pac. 642 (1902) . This position
is the overwhelming majority view.

For a review of these and

many other cases with similar holdings, see Annotation, 79 ALR
2d 1309 (1961), especially §5 at pp. 1323-26.
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Although the renewal statute was not involved, the Utah
decisions are consistent with this widely accepted position.
In AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co. , 714
P. 2d 289 (Utah 1986) , the Utah Supreme Court held that §38-111, U.C.A., the Utah Mechanics1 Lien Statute, which requires
an action to enforce the lien to be brought within 12 months,
was jurisdictional and:
"limits a lienor's rights to 12 months after his
work is completed. At that point both his rights
and
his
remedies
under
the
statute
are
extinguished" (at 292).
The court further stated, at p. 291:
"Mechanics' liens are statutory creatures unknown
to the common law.
. . . compliance with the
statute is required before a party is entitled to
the benefits created by the statute."
And then quoting from D. M. Foley Co. , Inc. v. North West Fed.
S & L Assoc. , 122 111. App. 3d 411, 77 111. Dec. 877, 461 N.E.
2d 500 (1984), the court stated:
"The statutory period *is not merely a statute of
limitations but a condition of liability itself and
not just a limitation on the remedy'. The court
held that the potential liability of subsequent
purchasers perished inchoate when plaintiffs failed
to bring suit within the period allowed after
completion of the work."
Since the statutory period is a condition of liability and not
a statute of limitation, the renewal statute would not apply
to extend the time for filing such an action.
While no Utah decisions have been found specifically
ruling on the applicability of the renewal statute to the Utah
Trust Deed Act, the Supreme Court has stated that the time
22

requirements of the Utah Trust Deed Act are not statutes of
limitation. See McCarthy v, Lewis, 615 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1980)
at 1259, ftn 4.

In that case it was held that the automatic

stay of the Bankruptcy Act did not apply to the three-month
reinstatement provision of the Utah Trust Deed Act, §57-1-24,
U.C.A.

That such time requirements are not statutes of

limitation is consistent with the general view that the time
requirements of such statutes are conditions upon the exercise
of the right itself and are limitations not only of the remedy
but of the substantive right.
On the other hand, when the limitation period is not in
the statute creating the cause of action, the renewal statute
would

apply

to extend

the time

for

filing

the action.

Similarly, the tolling provisions of Chapter 12, Title 78,
would also toll the running of the statute of limitation on a
statutory cause of action which does not contain its own
limitation period.

This was the holding of Switzer v.

Reynolds, 606 P. 2d 244

(Utah 1980) with respect to the

wrongful death statute of §78-11-7 which does not contain a
limitation period and thus the Title 78, Chapter 12 limitation
4

period was tolled by §78-12-36 because of disability.

But,

that case, on p. 246, recognizes and adopts the principle
which is applicable here:

4

. .

For a similar holding with respect to §78-12-35 on tolling by absence
from the state see Seely v. Cowley, 12 U.2d 252, 365 P.2d 65 (1961).
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"In a case where the limitation period has been
construed as merely affecting the remedy but not
the right of action itself, a tolling statute has
been held applicable to a statute of limitations
for wrongful death. In contrast, the limitation
period was not tolled due to infancy, where the
wrongful death statute was construed as creating a
right of action that did not exist at common law
and thus the time restriction provided therein
affected the right of action and not merely the
remedy."
It is apparent from a review of the cases in this area
that rights enacted by statute with relatively short time
requirements attached to those rights should not be affected
by

the

renewal

statutes

which

procedural statutes of limitation.

are

applicable

only

to

In this case, the three-

month filing requirement enacted as part of the right to sue
for a deficiency

is a jurisdictional

exercise of that right.

restriction on the

The failure to bring this action

within three months from the trustee's sale bars Standard's
right to recover a deficiency judgment.
D. OP ALL THE UTAH CASES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED
THE APPLICATION OP THE RENEWAL STATUTE, NONE
HAS APPLIED IT TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR PILING
A STATUTORY CAUSE OP ACTION CONTAINING ITS
OWN INTERNAL TIME LIMITATION.
As has already been stated, no Utah cases have been
found which specifically rule on the applicability of the
renewal statute to the Utah Trust Deed Act.

In fact, no such

cases from any jurisdiction have been found.

There are,

however, numerous Utah decisions which have ruled on the
applicability

of the renewal statute to other causes of
24

action.

For example, the renewal statute has been applied to

a suit on a judgment which had been voluntarily dismissed by
the plaintiff, Luke v. Bennion, supra; to a suit for damages
for false imprisonment which had been dismissed just prior to
trial because the original complaint was not presented to the
court, Salisbury v. Poulson, 57 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315 (1918);
to a suit for breach of a written agreement which had been
dismissed on a motion for nonsuit which by statute was not a
determination on the merits, Gutheil v. Gilmer. 27 Utah 496,
76 Pac. 628 (1904); to a suit to recover a commission which
had also been dismissed on a motion for nonsuit, Williams v.
Nelson. 45 Utah 255, 145 pac. 39

(1914) ; to a suit for

wrongful death, which had been dismissed otherwise than on the
merits, Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213
pac. 187 (1923) ; to a suit in federal court to enforce a
stockholder's liability which had been voluntarily dismissed
in state court by the plaintiff, Jones v. Jenkins. 22 F.2d 642
(1927) ; to a suit for negligence under the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act which had been dismissed for failure to file
the required notice with the health care provider at least 90
days before commencing the action, Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d
144 (Utah 1979); and to a suit for gross negligence against
former state officers in their individual capacities when a
prior suit against them in their official capacities had been
dismissed for failure to file the required notice with the
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state within one year after the cause of action arose, Madsen
v, Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988).
In each of these cases the time for filing the second
action was held to be extended by the renewal statute because
the first action had been timely filed and had been dismissed
otherwise than on the merits. However, none of them involved
a statutory action in which the enabling statute contained its
own time limitation on the filing of the action.

The Platz

case, supra, did involve a wrongful death action, which is
statutory, but the enabling statute did not provide a time
limitation.

Instead, the general statutes of limitations

governed such an action.

And, indeed, consistent with the

conclusion in Point I.B., above, the codification of the
general statutes of limitations includes specifically the
limitation on wrongful death actions, §78-12-28(2), U.C.A.,
within those covered by Chapter 12 of Title 78 (see §78-12-1)
and, therefore, affected by the renewal statute of §78-12-40.
Conversely, the Foil v. Ballinaer case, supra, involves the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act which does contain its own
time limitation but does not create the right to sue for
negligence, since that right existed at common law.

Rather,

that act was intended to "provide a reasonable time in which
actions may be commenced against health care providers", §7814-2, and is also included within Chapter 12, Title 78 and is,
therefore, also covered by §78-12-1 and affected by the
renewal statute of §78-12-40.
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On the other hand, Foil v. Ballincrer. also involved the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, since the case was filed
against the University of Utah Medical Center as well as the
individual doctor.

The lower court dismissed the action

against the state entity with prejudice for failure to file
the prerequisite notice with the state.
from that dismissal.

No appeal was taken

Apparently, it was understood that the

renewal statute would not apply to a claim under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. However, in a later case, Yates v.
Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (1980), the Supreme
Court held that the renewal statute does not apply to extend
the time for filing an action under the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act when the prerequisite notice is not given because
§63-30-13 of that Act provides that such a claim is "barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the
political subdivision within one year after the cause of
action arises."
Neither

Foil

nor

Yates

reached

the

question

of

application of the renewal statute if proper notice had been
filed as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and an
action had been timely commenced and later dismissed otherwise
than on the merits.

Madsen v. Borthick. supra, also did not

address this question because it was intentionally filed
against

the

former

state

officials

in their

individual

capacities in order to avoid the then-expired time limit for
filing notice with the state.
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See 769 P.2d 247, 1st J[.

Furthermore, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did not then
contain

its

own

governmental

limitation

employees

for

although

filing
it

did

a

suit

contain

against
such

a

limitation for filing suit against the governmental entity
itself.

§63-30-15, U.C.A. 1953, Second Replacement Volume 7A

(1978).

Accordingly, Madsen v. Borthick considered

the

general statutes of limitations of §§78-12-26, 28 and 29 to
apply to the suit against the officials in their individual
capacities.

See text at footnote 13 on page 253 and the next

to last paragraph on page 254.

Section 63-30-15 was amended

in 1985 (after the cause of action arose in Madsen v. Borthick
but before the decision thereon) to apply to suits against the
employees

as

well

as

against

the

governmental

entity.

Therefore, the question as to the applicability of the renewal
statute

to

the

internal

time

limitation

of

the

Utah

Governmental Immunity Act has not yet been considered.

If

that question arises, it is submitted that the renewal statute
would not apply for the reasons set forth in Point I.e.,
above. Alternatively, if it were determined that the renewal
statute

applied,

such

a

determination,

in

order

to

be

consistent with prior decisions, would have to be made based
on a conclusion that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does
not create the cause of action for negligence but only waives
the immunity of the state and its employees from such actions.
There appears to be no Utah case which has applied the
renewal statute to a cause of action created by a statute
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which contains its own time limitation for the filing of that
cause of action. On the other hand, all of the Utah cases are
consistent with and support the position that the renewal
statute does not apply to such causes of action.
POINT II
STANDARD'S CLAIM AGAINST KIRKBRIDE AND SOULE IS
BARRED FOR FAILURE TO ALLOW THREE MONTHS FOR
REINSTATEMENT UNDER §57-1-24, U.C.A. OF THE UTAH
TRUST DEED ACT.
The standards of strict compliance with the requirements
of the Utah Trust Deed Act are set forth in Point I.A., above.
The reasons for strict compliance with those requirements are
adequately discussed there and need not be repeated here.
Because the jurisdictional time restriction on a deficiency
action has been considered central to this case, little
attention has been given to an additional defect in Standard's
actions leading up to its trustee's sale.

Section 57-1-24,

U.C.A., provides:
"The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may
not be exercised until:
(1) The trustee first files for record . . .
a notice of default . . . ;
(2) Not less than three months has thereafter
elapsed; and
(3) After the lapse of at least three months
the trustee shall give notice of sale as
provided in this act." (emphasis added)
In this case, the Notice of Default was recorded November
5, 1986 (R.17) and the Notice of Trustee's Sale was given on
February 2, 1987 (R.19), before three months had expired after
recording of the Notice of Default.
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Under the clear and

strict wording of §57-1-24, the trustee may not exercise the
power of sale and the notice of sale may not be given until
"not less than three months" has elapsed after recording the
notice of default. In view of the strictness with which these
requirements must be followed, they are conditions on the
right to exercise the power of sale.

Blodgett v. Martsch,

supra, at 303, holds that the trustee's failure to post sale
notices where required, to completely describe the property
and to inquire as to the trustors' preference as to joint or
sequential sale of tracts, as required by §§57-1-25 and 27,
may have been violations of these statutory duties. However,
the requirements of those sections of the trust deed act are
not prefaced by the conditional words, "may not be exercised
until," that appear in §57-1-24.

A fortiori, a failure to

follow the requirements of that section, is a violation of
duty and a bar to further proceedings under the statute.
All the requirements of the Utah Trust Deed Act are to be
strictly construed and each of the steps provided in the act
are preconditions to the exercise of the next step. That is,
a transfer in trust (§57-1-20), a qualified trustee (§57-121), a breach of the secured obligation (§57-1-23), notice of
default and reinstatement period (§57-1-24 and 31(1)), notice
of sale (§57-1-25), and a trustee's sale (§57-1-27) are all
prerequisite to the right to a deficiency given in §57-1-32.
A failure to take each of these steps carefully bars the right
to take the final step to obtain a deficiency.
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Standard has

not only stumbled on its path to a deficiency judgment but has
skipped an essential step on that path.

Its right to a

deficiency was lost long ago and this court should direct the
dismissal of its claim with prejudice.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Trust Deed Act was enacted to provide a more
speedy and efficient remedy to enforce real property-secured
obligations and to realize on the security.

This remedy

eliminated the traditional protections available to the debtor
and, in return, required the creditor to follow the strict
requirements of this new remedy. A creditor electing to take
advantage of the benefits of that more efficient remedy must
also pay the price of carefully pursuing that remedy according
to the conditions which control it.
the rights given to him.

Otherwise, he will lose

Standard has not met all of the

conditions which are prerequisite to a deficiency judgment.
It failed to allow the full reinstatement period and it failed
to

file this action within

the time

allowed

after

its

trustee's sale. Those failures result in a loss of its right
to a deficiency.
The strict conditions of the Utah Trust Deed Act are not
altered by the renewal statute and the rules of statutory
construction require that the two statutes be construed to
avoid any conflict and to carry out the purposes of both. The
codification of the general statutes of limitation clearly
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provides that the renewal and other provisions of Chapter 12,
Title 78 do not apply to the Utah Trust Deed Act.
The time requirements of the trust deed act are not
statutes of limitation but are jurisdictional conditions on
the exercise of the rights provided therein. The statutes of
limitations do not apply to such rights.
jurisdictions

do

not

apply

renewal

The majority of

statutes

to

similar

statutes with internal limitations and the Utah cases which
have considered the application of the renewal statute or of
tolling statutes all support and are consistent with this
view.
Although the question of application of the renewal
statute to the trust deed act appears to be a question of
first impression, the rules of law and the holdings of cases
involving related questions require that the renewal statute
not be applied to the trust deed act in order to preserve
consistency.

Such a conclusion is also required to preserve

the purposes of the trust deed act and will not interfere with
the purpose of the renewal statute itself.
Standard had three months after its trustee's sale to
correctly file an action for a deficiency.

Because of its

careless failure to comply with the strict conditions which
control its right to a deficiency, it has forfeited that
right.

It is now attempting to use the procedural renewal

statute to stretch out its substantive three-month right to
more than two years.

That is contrary to the purpose of the
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trust deed act and should not be allowed.

Furthermore, the

potential for intentional abuse of that purpose should be
checked.

The order of the lower court should, therefore, be

reversed with instructions to dismiss Standard's Complaint
with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

Ralph J. Majtsh
Attorneys for Appellant
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